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Introduction 
Most systems of welfare support for the unemployed make receipt of benefit 
conditional on the individual making efforts to seek work, to be available for work 
and not to impose unreasonable restrictions on the type of work they accept – what 
are collectively known as eligibility conditions. Grubb (2000) provides an overview 
of different OECD countries regulations of this type and argues that “the enforcement 
of eligibility criteria may have a larger impact on behaviour than variations in 
replacement rates…because the income implications for the individual are larger” 
(Grubb, 2000, p149), although discussions of the incentive effects of UI systems tend 
to focus on the level and duration of benefits. 
 This paper is about the impact of a major change to the UK system of welfare 
support for the unemployed in October 1996 – the introduction of the Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA).  This change had a large number of elements (described in more 
detail below) but the most important aspect was a stricter enforcement of eligibility 
conditions.  Indeed the name change from the previous Unemployment Benefit 
suggests the new emphasis on this welfare benefit being an allowance for those who 
are looking for work instead of an income for those who are unemployed (that they 
have a right to because of previous social security contributions they have paid). 
 In the UK, JSA is widely believed to have been a ‘big deal’.  The reason for 
this can be understood from a few pictures.  Figure 1 presents the time series on the 
UK claimant count for the period 1984-2004.  JSA was introduced at a time when the 
claimant count was falling but the months following introduction show a markedly 
higher rate of decline.  The fall in the seasonally adjusted claimant count in November 
1996 was the highest ever recorded (Sweeney and McMahon, 1998).  The reduction 
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in the claimant count seems primarily to have been due to an increased off-flow rather 
than a reduced on-flow as can be seen from Figure 2.   
This is impressionistic evidence but more formal econometric evidence for an 
increase in the outflow rate from the claimant count is strong.  To make this point I 
used the JUVOS dataset, a 5% random sample of claimants that contains information 
of start and end dates as well as crude demographic characteristics (gender, age and 
region).  I estimated a model of the exit rate from the claimant count using a Cox 
semi-parametric proportional hazard model with the baseline hazard being a function 
of some demographics and separate dummies for each month.  The coefficients on 
these month dummies are plotted in Figure 3, where the vertical line marks the 
introduction of JSA.  There is clear evidence that the exit rate is higher after JSA than 
before (the standard error on an individual monthly estimate is about 0.044 so these 
differences are very significant).  The estimate of a model of these month dummies on 
a polynomial in time (to capture trends in the outflow rate), month dummies and a 
post-JSA dummy is reported in Table 1.  According to these estimate the introduction 
of JSA raised exit rates from the claimant count by between 21% and 28%, a very 
large impact. 
It does seem that JSA had an impact on the claimant count but did it also have 
the other intended effects notably to encourage greater search activity among the 
unemployed that, presumably, leads to higher flows into employment?  It is widely 
believed that it did.  The research commissioned by the UK government into the 
impact of JSA – see Trickey et al (1998), McKay et al (1999), Rayner et al, (2000), 
and Smith et al (2000) - is voluminous but a good summary is “the initial increase in 
movements off benefit was due to a ‘weeding out’ of those who were not previously 
assiduous in their job search or were claiming fraudulently; and secondly, a stepping-
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up of job search efforts on the part of jobseekers leading to more successful rates of 
movement off benefit in the period immediately after the introduction of JSA” 
(Rayner et al 2000, p1). 
Unfortunately the research design used in this ‘evaluation’ has limitations.  
The precise reasons for this are described below but it primarily consisted of a 
comparison of two cohorts of claimants – one taken before JSA and one taken after.  
This research design is unable to take account of the changing composition of the 
claimant count if JSA weeded out those with low search intensity and unable to 
consider the fate of those who were moved off the claimant count.  If all those leaving 
the claimant count went into employment that might not be such a deficiency but 
there is evidence to suggest that many of those removed from the claimant count 
remained non-employed.  Figure 4 presents a comparison of the claimant count with 
the numbers who are unemployed on the ILO definition (looked for work in the past 4 
weeks and available to start work within 2 weeks).  Prior to JSA these two series 
tracked each other very closely (though there were always some claimants who were 
not ILO unemployed and vice versa) but after JSA there is a remarkable divergence 
that has never disappeared.  This suggests that JSA removed some claimants who 
were and remained unemployed on the ILO definition, perhaps suggesting that the 
eligibility conditions under JSA were stricter than those implied by the ILO definition 
of unemployment.  Information on the destination of claimants leaving the count are 
also recorded, albeit somewhat imperfectly.  Figure 4 plots the proportion of exits to 
employment, to inactivity (which includes sickness and disability benefits, retirement, 
training and education and death) and to an unknown destination.  There is no 
evidence of a rise in the proportion of exits to employment after JSA and it also 
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suggests that a rising proportion of those leaving the claimant count were to 
destinations unknown1. 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  The next section discusses related 
literature and how this paper makes a contribution to it.  The second section then 
discusses the changes to the welfare system associated with the introduction of JSA.  
The third section discusses the existing evaluation of JSA, arguing that some (though 
not all) of the conclusions drawn are not really justified on the basis of the analysis 
done.  The fourth section discusses what economic theory has to say about the impact 
of stricter eligibility conditions making the simple (but perhaps surprising point) that 
those who are moved off welfare as a result of these rules may actually choose to 
reduce their search activity.  The fifth section discusses the data used in this paper and 
reproduces the results obtained in the existing evaluation when using its methodology.  
The sixth section then proposes a different methodology to get a better estimate of the 
impact of JSA that avoids the problems identified in the existing evaluation.  It shows 
that JSA did have a sizeable impact on the flows out of claimant status but that this 
flow was all into non-claimant non-employment and that this impact was larger for 
those with low initial levels of job search activity – this is the ‘weeding-out’ effect.  
The seventh section shows, however that the best estimate of the ‘average’ treatment 
effect on search activity is very close to zero.  The eighth section then investigates 
whether there is any impact on the distribution of search activity but none is found.  
The bottom line is that there is no evidence here that JSA had any impact on the 
behaviour of any of the non-employed even though it did have a sizeable ‘weeding-
out’ effect. 
                                                 
1 See also Machin and Marie (2004) for evidence that JSA led to increases in crime.  These extra 
crimes are not necessarily committed by the non-employed so this does not necessarily imply anything 
about employment destinations but it is suggestive that some of those leaving JSA are taking desparate 
measures. 
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1. Relationship to Existing Literature 
  There are a number of strands of existing literature related to the subject 
matter of this paper.   
First, there is a sizeable literature on the impact of stricter eligibility 
requirements in UI systems and one might wonder what this study contributes to that 
literature.  This is an especially pertinent question as many of these studies use 
randomised trials so might be thought to be higher quality than any analysis of JSA 
(that was a non-experimental nationwide change) could possibly hope to be.  Most of 
the evidence from randomised trials comes from the US.  Often these experiments 
mix job search assistance with work search requirements so that there is a 
combination of carrots and sticks involved.  Meyer (1995) provides a very useful 
review of the early studies and more recent ones can be found in Klepinger et al 
(1997), Ashenfelter et al (1998), Black et al (2003).  Typically these studies find that 
increased job search assistance leads to modest but cost-effective reductions in UI 
duration but the conclusions on the impact of stricter eligibility conditions seems 
more mixed.  Ashenfelter et al (1998) found little or no impact of tighter eligibility 
checks on UI duration while Klepinger et al (1997) did find a modest impact of 
requiring reporting of employer contacts.  In the UK there is one randomized trial 
(though others of recent policy initiatives are now under way) – that of the Restart 
scheme that was introduced in 1989 (see Dolton and O’Neill, 1995, 1996, 2002, for 
evaluation of this programme in various dimensions).  In many ways this was a 
precursor to JSA as it introduced the requirement of a compulsory eligibility check 
after 12 months of unemployment (later reduced to 6 months). 
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 Given the existence of randomized trials with similar interventions one might 
wonder what is the contribution to knowledge that can be expected from studying JSA 
as its introduction applied to everyone.  There are several reasons for thinking that 
there is useful information to be had from the study of JSA.  First, findings from other 
countries do not obviously generalise.  Indeed, it will become apparent that all the 
evidence suggests that the introduction of JSA resulted in larger numbers of 
individuals moving off benefits so that the US studies that find little impact of stricter 
eligibility checks would not seem to apply in the UK case – whether this is because 
the UK requirements are now stricter or were laxer than the typical US system is 
unclear. 
 Secondly, the study of a large change makes it possible to trace the impact 
using national data sets rather than the specially constructed data sets commonly used 
in the randomized trials.  All of the randomized trials primarily report the impact of 
the treatment on UI receipt and duration and, while this is of some independent 
interest, one might also be interested in the destinations after leaving UI.  The 
motivation for many of the interventions is not just to move claimants off benefit to 
reduce the burden on the public purse but also to move people from unemployment to 
employment.  A number of the studies give the impression that all those leaving UI 
must be going into employment but there are some reasons to be sceptical abut this – 
Figures 3 and 4 suggest this may not have happened with JSA.  Many of the US 
studies do report impacts on employment and earnings (tracking them through the 
social security system) but it is very hard to know from these studies what fraction of 
those leaving UI are actually ending up in employment.  The evidence on JSA 
presented below suggests that more attention should be paid to the destinations of 
those leaving UI.  Of course, how important this effect is likely to be depends on 
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whether the intervention under consideration is primarily a ‘carrot’ or a ‘stick’: while 
JSA has aspects of both, the stick aspect seems the dominant one in practice. 
 Also relevant are the primarily Dutch studies of the impact of temporary 
sanctions imposed on UI recipients for some violations of eligibility conditions With 
the exception of van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) these are non-experimental 
(see Abbring et al, 1997; van den Berg at al, 2004).  Identification is achieved in these 
models by the assumption that hazard rates have a mixed proportional form.  These 
studies find a very large effect of sanctions on the hazard rate both out of UI and into 
employment, effects that seem to last much longer than the duration of the sanctions 
themselves.  These studies stand out as having results that are very different from the 
ones found here. 
 The focus of this paper on search activity also means the paper has relevance 
for the smaller literature that considers the impact of benefit receipt on job search 
(see, for example, Blau and Robins, 1990, for the US, and Wadsworth, 1991, Schmitt 
and Wadsworth, 1993, 2002, for the UK).  These studies typically find that claimants 
search more actively than non-claimants though a big problem with these studies is 
the direction of the causality.  Consideration of a change like JSA is helpful in 
establishing whether the relationship is causal or not. 
 Finally this paper hopes to make a contribution to the literature on the 
determination of search activity among the non-employed.  As the definition of labour 
market participation is based primarily on whether an individual searches for work, 
this can be thought of as a contribution to the economics of labour supply.  This 
approach to labour supply has been taken before (see, for example, Burdett and 
Mortensen, 1978, Burdett et al, 1984, Blundell at al, 1987, 1998) but the literature on 
it is surprisingly small and one often comes away from that literature with the 
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impression that it is a nuisance to be controlled for when one is studying the important 
aspect of labour supply - hours of work – rather than an important issue in itself. 
 
2. What Is the Jobseeker’s Allowance? 
JSA is the current system of welfare for those who are unemployed in the UK.   It was 
introduced on 7 October 1996 replacing the previous system of Unemployment 
Benefit and Income Support (UB/IS).  JSA comes in two forms. Contributory JSA 
(known as contJSA) is a UI scheme with entitlement based on previous national 
insurance contributions (as the UK social security payments are known) of limited 
duration (6 months being the maximum), and not means-tested.  This replaced the 
previous UI scheme called Unemployment Benefit.  Income-based JSA (known as 
incJSA) is a UA scheme of potentially unlimited duration and potentially open to all 
but means-tested.  This replaced the previous UA scheme of Income Support.  incJSA 
is much more important with 85% of recipients of JSA getting that form in February 
1997 and even among those with a duration of claim less than 6 months who are 
potentially eligible for contJSA approximately 75% are receiving incJSA.  The reason 
for this is that many of the unemployed have insufficient National Insurance 
contributions for entitlement to contJSA and the level of contJSA is quite low with 
payments being topped up through incJSA if, for example, there are dependents in the 
claimant’s household. 
 But the change of JSA was not simply a change of name: there were 
substantive changes.  Like most welfare systems, JSA is very complicated (see 
Poynter and Barnes, 1997, for a 400-page guide to JSA produced for claimants) and 
there were many changes in the switch from UB/IS to JSA.  But the most important 
changes can classified into two main areas. 
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 First there were changes to the duration and level of benefits in the move from 
UB to contJSA.  UB had been payable for a maximum duration of 12 months and this 
was reduced to 6 and the level of UB had been 10% higher than the level of IS and 
this differential was eliminated.  But, because a relatively small proportion of 
unemployed claimants received UB the impact of this was relatively modest – Figure 
6 plots the average payments received across the introduction of JSA – there is no 
very marked change. 
 Secondly (and, I will argue, more importantly) there were changes to the job 
search requirements required for eligibility.  All claimants had to agree and sign a 
Jobseeker’s Agreement with the Employment Service Staff – a copy of one is 
attached in Appendix A.  This detailed the type of job being sought, when the 
claimant was able to work, and what steps will be taken to identify and apply for jobs.  
Claimants were required to keep a record of their job search activities and at 
fortnightly interviews these records were checked against what had been detailed in 
the agreement.  Furthermore, Employment Service staff were given the power to 
direct claimants to apply for certain jobs.2  All of this was backed up with a greater 
threat of sanctions and disqualification though the actual size of the sanctions 
themselves was relatively modest.  It seems likely that the main means by which JSA 
moved claimants off benefit was by introducing the extra administrative hurdle of the 
Jobseeker’s Agreement as other studies report that simply sending a letter inviting a 
UI recipient to an interview that is meant to be of assistance to them (see Black et al, 
2003 for a US example and Dolton and O’Neill, 2002, for a UK example) is enough 
to make a sizeable proportion ‘disappear’. 
                                                 
2 There is of course a question about their ability to force claimants to take jobs – see the website 
www.urban75.com/Action/Jsa/jsa2.html for entertaining and creative advice to claimants on how to 
subvert the efforts of the ES to get you a job including “If you get an interview be (un)imaginative. Ask 
employers which union represents their workforce and whether they would object to you joining it, or, 
if there isn't one, starting one up”. 
 10
 The thinking behind JSA was not entirely new.  There was a widespread 
perception that in the very severe ‘Thatcher’ recession of the early 1980s, eligibility 
checks had virtually disappeared as the caseload rose, the number of case-workers 
was reduced and the benefit administration and employment service were separated.  
But beginning in the mid 1980s there were increasing attempts to enforce existing and 
strengthen eligibility conditions (see Schmitt and Wadsworth, 2002, for a list of all 
the changes).  For example the Restart scheme that started in 1986 increased the 
monitoring of the job search activity of the long-term unemployed, first for those with 
duration more than 12 months and later extended to those unemployed for more than 
six months.  Schmitt and Wadsworth (2002) argue that the fall in the proportion of the 
male unemployed who are claimants were mostly caused by stricter eligibility 
requirements3. But, although JSA can be seen as the continuation of an existing trend 
it was much more radical in requiring an explicit statement of what job search would 
be done and holding claimants to this.  And, as has already been seen in Figures 1 and 
2 there does indeed seem to have been a particularly large impact effect. 
 
3. The Existing ‘Evaluation’ of the Impact of JSA 
The UK government did make some attempt to do an evaluation of the impact of JSA.  
But it did not choose to use a randomized trial that had been used to evaluate the 
earlier Restart programme.  Essentially, a `before and after’ approach was taken with 
two cohorts of benefit claimants.  The first cohort was drawn from those unemployed 
in July 1995 (i.e. pre-JSA) who were interviewed in Autumn 1995, Spring 1996 and 
Summer 1997.  The second cohort was drawn from a post-JSA sample and 
interviewed twice.  The methodology for evaluating JSA was essentially a comparison 
                                                 
3 This is perhaps in contrast to the US where Blank and Card (1992) ascribe a similar trend to falling 
take-up. 
 11
of the behaviour of these two cohorts.  There are a number of reports on this but the 
findings are well-summarized by “the initial increase in movements off benefit was 
due to a ‘weeding out’ of those who were not previously assiduous in their job search 
or were claiming fraudulently; and secondly, a stepping-up of job search efforts on the 
part of jobseekers leading to more successful rates of movement off benefit in the 
period immediately after the introduction of JSA” (Rayner et al 2000, p1).   
 Unfortunately, the research design of this evaluation means that the foundation 
of some of these conclusions is not as strong as might be hoped for.  There are two 
main problems.  First, if JSA did have a ‘weeding-out’ effect and disproportionately 
removed low search activity individuals from the claimant count (and the evidence 
presented below suggests that it did) then the average level of search intensity among 
those who remain will be higher purely because of the composition effect.  The post-
JSA cohort will show more search activity than the pre-JSA cohort but this need not 
represent any change in behaviour at all. 
The second problem is that the research design gives no information on what 
happens to the search activity of those who were removed from the claimant count by 
JSA but did not go into employment – the evidence of Figure 4 suggests this is quite a 
large group.  A reading of the literature often gives the impression that the fate of this 
group is of no concern, either because they are not searching for work (so cannot do 
less and might do more) or because they are abusing the system through a fraudulent 
claim.  But a less perjorative view would see at least some of this group as simply 
having a level of search activity insufficient to meet the tighter eligibility restrictions 
(and Figure 4 suggests many are still unemployed on the ILO definition) without 
labelling them as ‘cheats’ in any way.  And, as the next section makes clear, we 
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would expect some impact on the search activity of those who are moved off the 
claimant count. 
 
4. A Simple Model of Search Activity 
In this section we present a very simple model of search intensity to develop some 
predictions about the likely impact of tighter eligibility conditions.  The model is a 
familiar one in the literature (e.g. see Barron and Mellow, 1979; Mortensen, 1986) 
 There is a distribution of wage offers f(w) that arrive at a certain rate, ( )u sλ  
for the non-employed and ( )e sλ  for the employed that can be influenced by the level 
of search activity, s, that has costs ( )uc s  for the non-employed and ( )ec s  for the 
employed.  The non-employed get a flow income of b and have to choose the 
reservation wage, r, and the search intensity s.  The value function for being without a 
job can be written as: 
 ( ),max ( ) ( ) ( )u us r u urV b s V w V dF w c sβ λ  = + − − ∫  (1) 
where β is the discount factor.  The employed are assumed to face an exogenous risk 
of job loss δ  so their value function can be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ( ) ( ) us e ewV w w s V x V w dF x V V w c sβ λ δ  = + − + − −    ∫  (2) 
and they also have to choose their search intensity.  The optimal policies are derived 
in Appendix B but the essence of the model can be captured in a simple diagram.  If 
we substitute out the optimal reservation wage as a function of b and search intensity 
then the indifference curves in b-s space for the non-employed will be as drawn in 
Figure 7.  A rise in b always raises utility and it is non-monotonic in s as there is an 
optimal search intensity.  If income while unemployed is independent of search effort 
then the optimal search effort can be read off from the point where the indifference 
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curves are horizontal.  Figure 7 shows the optimal levels of search intensity for two 
levels of b – s must be declining in b for the simple reason that higher b makes non-
employment more attractive relative to employment. 
 A constant b can be thought of as a welfare system for the unemployed that is 
independent of search effort.  But a simple representation of a welfare system with 
eligibility checks is that the payment of benefits is conditional on search effort being 
above a certain level.  For simplicity assume that the required search effort is non-
stochastic and known with certainty - denote it by s*.  The budget line facing an 
individual non-employed person can be thought of as a low level of benefits (it could 
be zero) if s<s* and a higher level of benefits if s>s* - this is represented in Figure 8. 
 Now consider how the individual’s search intensity varies with the strictness 
of the eligibility requirement.  If s* is very low then the individual will choose Ls  and 
the eligibility condition will not bind.  If * Ls s=  the eligibility constraint starts to bind 
and further increases in it lead to one-for-one increases in search intensity.  This goes 
on until we reach the point s** where the individual is indifferent between searching 
at s** (and receiving welfare benefits) and leaving claimant status.  A further increase 
in s* makes the individual think it is too onerous to meet the eligibility requirements 
and search intensity falls back to Hs .  Note that an increase in job search requirements 
in this case has actually led to a fall in search activity and a move out of claimant 
status.  The relationship between the search activity of the individual and s* will be as 
plotted in Figure 9. 
 This should make it clear that economic theory does suggest that there is 
reason to be interested in the impact of tighter eligibility conditions on those who 
leave the claimant count as a result.  It is possible that the search activity of this group 
actually falls.  Such an effect is not inevitable – if, for example, one moves from a 
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system with no effective eligibility checks to one with strict ones then even those who 
leave the claimant count will raise their search effort because the level of benefit has 
fallen.  A similar analysis could apply if the level of benefits paid for a given level of 
s* is reduced: some individuals may leave the claimant count as a result and their 
search activity may fall.  In understanding these effects it is important to think of the 
welfare system as a subsidy to job search and not just a payment to those without 
work. 
 There are other possible ways in which the benefit system could affect search 
intensity.  The specification of the utility function in (1) assumes that the time and 
money involved in search activity is separable from the utility from income.  It is 
possible that there are ‘perverse’ effects of benefits on job search if there are strong 
enough income effects e.g. workers at subsistence level or who are liquidity-
constrained or for whom leisure is locally inferior may use part of an increase to 
search harder for work (see, for example, Hamermesh, 1982; Ben-Horim and 
Zuckerman, 1987, and van den Berg, 1990).  Schmitt and Wadsworth (1993, 2002) 
also suggest that not being in claimant status reduces access to the job-placement part 
of the Employment Service so may reduce flows out of non-employment.  There are 
also models of the impact of sanctions paying particular attention to the stochastic 
element of the eligibility conditions (see Boone et al, 2000, 2001), something that 
probably adds both realism and complication to the model.  If the level of s* is 
stochastic then one would expect a smooth but still non-monotonic relationship 
between s and the strength of the eligibility conditions. 
 What this section has suggested is that a complete evaluation of JSA must take 
account of any impact on those who are moved out of claimant status and that the 
impact on job search intensity may have a different sign for different people.  The 
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theory suggests that those with very high search intensity may see no effect (the 
eligibility conditions never bind), those with a lower level of search intensity may see 
a rise to maintain their claimant status and some of those who move out of claimant 
status may actually see falls in their search activity.  Hence it is of some interest to 
look not just at average treatment effects but the distributional effect as well.  The 
methodology described below is designed to be able to address these concerns. 
 
5. Data 
This paper uses a methodology that is designed to avoide the pitfalls of the 
existing evaluation of JSA.  It is not a research design that one would choose if one 
was given the power to do so but, given the way in which JSA was implemented, it is 
the best I have come up with. 
 The main data set used in this paper is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), an 
address-based quarterly survey of approximately 60,000 households that is the basis 
for most UK labour market statistics (broadly it is equivalent to the US Current 
Population Survey though it is much more detailed).  Each sampled address is 
followed for 5 quarters so there is a limited panel element.  As this is a representative 
national sample no-one is going to go missing and the impact of JSA is large enough 
to be statistically detectable. 
 In addition to the usual demographic and labour market activity variables 
(descriptive statistics on which can be found in Appendix C, Table C1), the LFS has 
information on whether the individual is claiming unemployment-related benefits and 
on search activity: these questions form the basis for the analysis.  All those without a 
job are asked whether they have searched for work in the past week and in the past 4 
weeks (the latter information being used as part of the definition for ILO 
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unemployment).  Those who do not report looking for work in the past four months 
are then asked “even though you were not looking for work in the four weeks ending 
Sunday, would you like to have a regular paid job at the moment” – using this 
question one can divide the non-searchers into two categories – those who do not 
want work and those who do4.  Of course, one might wonder what exactly it means to 
want work in an abstract sense but not search for it but, in practice, those who report 
they do want work are more likely to enter employment than those who do not want 
work even though neither group is recorded as searching for work in the past 4 weeks 
(see Flinn and Heckman, 1983; Jones and Riddell, for statistical attempts to 
discriminate between these different labour market states).  I think it is probably best 
to think of those who want work but have not searched in the past 4 weeks as having a 
low level of search activity (e.g. they might have searched 6 weeks ago) rather than 
zero.  I will refer to this four-category classification of search activity as search 
intensity.  
 For those who have searched for work in the past 4 weeks, there are questions 
about the search methods used.  These can be analysed independently or a summary 
measure such as the number of search methods computed.  In practice these variables 
are correlated with moves into employment (see Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996) so, 
while they may not be perfect measures of search activity they do seem to capture 
some important elements of it. 
                                                 
4 There are then supplementary questions on why there is no job search among those who would like a 
job – for claimants, 28% report caring responsibilities, 15% the belief that no job is available (the 
traditional discouraged worker), 13% that they are long-term sick or disabled, 12% that they are 
temporarily sick or injured, 7% that they are a student, 6% that they have not started looking yet and 
18% give some other reason.  Among those who say they do not want work but are claimants, 41% 
report caring responsibilities as the reason , 19% that they are long-term sick or disabled, 7% that they 
are temporarily sick or injured, 12% that they are a student, 5% that they are retired and 14% give some 
other reason. 
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 A first purpose is to show, using this data, that one can mimic the ‘findings’ of 
the JSA evaluation.  Figure 10 presents a time-series on the proportion of claimants 
who report having searched for work in the past 4 weeks and in the past week.  The 
vertical line marks the introduction of JSA.  The ‘evaluation’ of JSA compared these 
variables at two points in time, before and after the introduction of JSA.  There seems 
to be a noticeable increase in the fraction of claimants who report searching in the 
past week/month after JSA.  Figure 11 then presents a similar time-series for the 
fraction of claimants who report they have not searched but do want a job and who do 
not want a job.  There is a noticeable fall in the proportions of claimants in these 
categories after the introduction of JSA.  Figure 12 reports the average number of 
search methods used by claimants.  Again there is a marked rise in the number around 
the introduction of JSA.  In the evaluation of JSA this type of evidence is interpreted 
as supportive of the view that JSA succeeded in raising the search intensity of the 
unemployed.  But, it does not control for the compositional changes in the claimant 
stock induced by JSA and it does not tell us anything about what is happening to those 
who are moved off the claimant count.  My way of dealing with these issues is 
described in the next section. 
 
6. Methodology 
 The methodology for estimating the impact of JSA is the following.  For a 
‘treatment’ group I use claimants in the period July to September 1996 inclusive.  
When first observed (what will be referred to as wave 1) these individuals will be 
subject to pre-JSA rules and their eligibility for benefits will be defined by the pre-
JSA rules.  But, when they are next observed 3 months later (what will be called wave 
2) they will be subject to JSA rules.  Of course, any change in labour market 
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outcomes or behaviour over these 3 months cannot be ascribed simply to the impact 
of JSA.  So, as the ‘control group’; we use claimants in the period April to June 1996 
inclusive: when these individuals are observed 3 months later in wave 2 they are still 
in the pre-JSA stage.  Of course one might wonder how good a control group this is 
but, as Table C1 shows the distribution of observed characteristics including job 
search activity is very similar in treatment and control groups so that it does not seem 
too unreasonable to assume the distribution of unobserved characteristics is also 
similar.  This finding also helps to allay fears that there were widespread anticipatory 
effects of the introduction of JSA on behaviour because, for example, that would 
cause differences in wave 1 search intensity between treatment and control groups.  
But the treatment and control groups cannot be similar in season and there might be 
concerns that any differences in outcomes between treatment and control groups 
simply reflect a normal seasonal pattern.  To allay these fears I construct treatment 
and control groups in the same way for 1995 (the ‘treatment’ group here is not 
receiving a treatment) and use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the 
impact of JSA.  In practice, in most of the paper I use a simple regression approach to 
estimating these treatment effects so estimate equations of the form: 
 0 1 1996 2 3 1996*y D JSA JSA Dβ β β β= + + +  (3) 
where y  is the outcome variable, 1996D  is a dummy variable for coming from the year 
1996, JSA  is a dummy variable for being form the July-September group and 
1996*JSA D  is an interaction between the two.  The coefficient on this last variable 
represents the difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of JSA.  Sometimes 
extra regressors are also included in (3) though their inclusion or exclusion typically 
makes little differences as would be expected given the evidence presented earlier that 
the treatment and control groups have very similar characteristics. 
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Is There Evidence of a Treatment? 
I start by presenting evidence that JSA did move people off benefits as was strongly 
suggested by the evidence from administrative data presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
Accordingly the dependent variable in (3) is whether the individual has stopped 
claiming at wave 2.  Estimates of the treatment effect are presented in Table 2.  Four 
estimates are presented – the straight comparison of treatment and control group for 
1996 and the difference-in-difference estimator, both with and without controls for 
individual characteristics. 
Table 2 presents estimate off the impact of JSA on the flow of claimants out of 
claimant status.  These estimates for 1996 alone suggest 9.8% of claimants were 
moved out of claimant status by JSA with the inclusion or exclusion of controls 
making little difference: the difference-in-difference estimators suggesting a lower 
figure of 6%.  These are in line with both the ONS estimates of 5-10% (Sweeney and 
McMahon, 1998) and almost exactly in line with the estimate of a 21-28% increase in 
the hazard rate from the earlier analysis of administrative data summarized in Table 
15.  Of course, these increased exits could be going to one of two destinations – 
employment or non-claimant non-employment.  The next part of Table 2 presents 
estimates of the flows to these two states.  As one can see, the 1996 data alone 
suggests a modest increase of 3 percentage points in the flow into employment but 
this disappears in the difference-in-difference estimates suggesting it represents a 
seasonal effect and not the true impact of JSA.  In contrast there remains a large 
estimated increase of about 6.7 percentage points in the flow from claimant status to 
                                                 
5 One can obtain this by using the formula that if approximately 69% of claimants remain in that state 
in the absence of JSA and this falls by 6% with the introduction of JSA then the proportional increase 
in the hazard is ln(ln(0.69-0.06)/ln(0.69))=0.22. 
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non-claimant non-employed – this is consistent with Figure 4.  So, JSA did increase 
the exit rates from the claimant count but did not increase the flows into employment. 
In what follows the sample used for estimation is often constructed as those 
who were initially claimants but who had not exited to employment because search 
activity is not observed for those who are subsequently employed.  There is clearly a 
selection issue involved in doing this but, given that the employment effect seems to 
be very small, this does not seem to be important in practice.  Table C2 also shows 
that the treatment and control groups remain balanced when the sample is restricted in 
this way.  The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the estimated impact of JSA on flows 
out of claimant status when the sample is constructed in this way – the estimates 
suggest that JSA increased the flow out of claimant status by 8 to 9 percentage points. 
Table 2 investigated the impact of JSA on flows out of claimant status.  But it 
is also possible that JSA had an impact on flows into claimant status.  Table 3 
presents a similar exercise for those who were non-employed non-claimants at wave 1 
and Table 4 for those who were employed at wave 1.  The estimated impacts of JSA 
are all very small suggesting small impacts on the inflow.  This is in line with Figure 
2 that suggested that most of the impact was on out-flows.  Given this, the rest of the 
paper focuses on those who were claimants at wave 1. 
As described above JSA had two main aspects: a reduction in potential 
benefits for claimants with less than 12 months duration and stricter enforcement of 
the eligibility conditions.  So, one might expect that the impact on outflows depends 
on the characteristics of the claimants.  Tables 5 to 7 investigate this.  Table 5 
interacts the JSA dummy with the four levels of search intensity at wave 1: those who 
have searched in the past week, those who searched only in the past 4 weeks, those 
who want a job but have not searched in the past 4 weeks and those who do not want 
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a job.  The first column shows that those who have searched in the past week are less 
likely to be moved off claimant status by JSA than those who want a job but have not 
searched in the past week.  There is a slight anomaly in that those who do not want 
work seem to have the smallest impact of JSA but the difference-in-difference 
estimates of the JSA impact for this group are large suggesting this is a seasonal 
effect.  It should be noted however that there is a significant estimated impact of JSA 
on those who have searched in the past week even though the impact is larger for 
those with lower initial levels of search intensity6.   
Table 6 does the same exercise but using the number of search methods in 
wave 1 as the measure of search activity.  The estimated impact of JSA is larger for 
those who report lower numbers of search methods in wave 1.  So, both Tables 5 and 
6 suggest that JSA had a ‘weeding-out’ effect as the existing evaluation concluded, 
disproportionately removing from he claimant count those with low levels of search 
activity.   
Finally Table 7 investigates the importance of the duration of claim by 
including controls for those with less than 12 months duration of claim (who were 
potentially affected by the benefit reductions).  The reported coefficients are the extra 
treatment effect for this group.  The coefficient of –0.045 in the first column of the 
first row of Table 7 suggests that short-duration claimants were less likely to be 
moved off claimant status than long duration claimants, the opposite of what would be 
expected to happen if the benefit reductions were the most important aspect of JSA.  
The second and third rows of Table 7 shows that this effect gets larger if one also 
controls for the differential impact of JSA according to the level of wave 1 search 
activity, either search intensity (the second row) or the number of search methods (the 
                                                 
6 It should be remembered that this is reported search activity prior to JSA so the intensity might 
change over time. 
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third row).  This suggests the main impact of JSA was from the tighter eligibility 
conditions and not from the benefit reductions.  This is consistent with the fact that 
the benefit reductions seem to have been small (see Figure 6). 
So, JSA does seem to have increased the flows out of claimant status, 
primarily (and maybe totally) into non-claimant non-employment.  The impact is 
estimated to be larger for those who initially reported low levels of search activity so 
JSA did have the intended ‘weeding-out’ effect.  But, what were the impacts on 
search behaviour? – this is the subject of the next section. 
 
7. The Impact of JSA on Job Search Activity: Average Treatment Effects 
 The previous section demonstrated that one way to lessen the impact of JSA 
was to be searching intensively and using a large number of different search methods.  
Given this one might expect that the incentives to search were increased by JSA (as 
was its intention) and one should be able to see this in the reported levels of search 
activity. 
 Table 8 investigates this using the two different measures of search activity.  
The first row reports the results where the measure of search activity is the four-fold 
categorization of search intensity.  This is estimated using an ordered probit so the 
four categories can be reduced to one dimension (later estimates look at the four 
categories separately).  The reported coefficients are the index in the ordered probit 
model.  The estimated treatment effects are tiny and insignificantly different from 
zero.  The second row does the same exercise but with the number of search methods 
as the dependent variable.  Again the estimated treatment effects are tiny and 
insignificantly different from zero.  There is no evidence here that JSA had any 
impact on reported job search activity.   
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How can this be reconciled with the graphical evidence presented in Figures 
10-12.  The answer is that JSA did disproportionately remove from the claimant count 
those with low levels of search activity – the changing composition of the claimant 
count then could account for some or all of the apparent increase in job search activity 
among claimants.  One can see this by attempting to estimate the impact of JSA on 
search activity using wave 2 claimants as the sample – not wave 1 claimant status.  
This is a similar exercise to that which was done in the official evaluation of JSA.  
The second panel of Table 8 shows that this leads both to large estimated ‘treatment’ 
effects that are significantly different from zero.  And these results are obtained using 
only one quarter pre- and post-JSA: precision would be much greater if more quarters 
were included.  However, it should be emphasized that these ‘treatment’ effects are 
spurious. 
A simple way of illustrating the difference between the true and ‘spurious’ 
treatment effects is contained in Table 9.  In the top panel the outcome measure is the 
proportion searching in the past week at wave 2 and in the bottom panel it is the 
average number of search methods used.  We report these outcome measures for those 
who remain claimants at wave 2, those who become non-employed non-claimants and 
for both groups together.  The ‘spurious’ treatment effect can be found by comparing 
the outcomes of treatment and control groups for those who remain claimants.  Both 
outcomes show an increase in search activity.  If one compares the outcomes for wave 
2 non-claimants one also finds increase in search activity, with a very large effect.  
But these apparent treatment effects are driven entirely by the changes in composition 
of the claimant stock as a result of the ‘weeding-out’.  The row labelled ‘all’ shows 
the true treatment effect and this is zero. 
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 There are two possible explanations for the finding of zero average treatment 
effects.  One is that there really is no effect on anyone, the other that there is an 
impact on the distribution of search effort with those who remain claimants increasing 
their search activity at the same time as those who leave the claimant count are 
perhaps reducing theirs as the theory presented above suggested.  The next section 
investigates distributional effects. 
 
8. The Impact of JSA on Job Search Activity: The Distribution of Treatment 
Effects 
 This section investigates whether there is any impact of JSA on the 
distribution of job search activity.  The theory presented in the fourth section 
suggested that there might be both an increase in the numbers reporting high levels of 
search activity and a low level of search activity.  This obviously has the ability to 
explain why the average treatment effect is essentially zero at the same time as JSA 
still had an impact on search activity. 
 There are a number of ways in which one might hope to detect any 
distributional effect.  The first is to consider directly the impact of JSA on the 
distribution of search activity with no other conditioning variables.  The second is to 
take advantage of the fact that the theory predicts different impacts on those with 
different levels of search activity.  Of course, we do not observed what search activity 
would have been in the absence of JSA but because job search activity is correlated 
over time (something that can be verified from an analysis of the control groups) one 
can look for different treatment effects by differing levels of wave 1 search activity.  
Finally the theory suggested different treatment effects for those who remain in and 
those who are moved out of claimant status with positive impacts for the former and 
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possibly negative effects for the latter.  So, a third strategy is to try to estimate 
average treatment effects for these two groups.  All of these strategies are tried in 
what follows. 
 
The Unconditional Distribution 
For the search intensity variable there are only four categories so that the 
distributional impact can be summarized by estimating the impact of JSA on the 
proportions of workers in those four categories.  These estimates are presented in 
Table 10.  There is perhaps a little bit of evidence that there is a rise in the proportion 
who don’t work at the expense of the proportions in the next two categories but the 
effects are small and insignificantly different from zero so there is not really any 
evidence here that the introduction of JSA led to a widening dispersion of outcomes. 
 Turning to the number of search methods, Table 11 reports the estimates of the 
impact of JSA on the proportion of workers reporting different number of search 
methods.  Again there seems to be no impact at any point in the distribution.   
There is no evidence here that the zero average treatment effect is hiding a 
widening dispersion but perhaps this has low power because one would expect very 
little impact on the overall distribution. 
 
The Conditional Distribution 
The theory presented in section 4 suggested that the impact of JSA might vary 
according to what the level of job search activity would be in the absence of JSA with 
zero effect for those with the highest search activity, positive effects for those in the 
middle and possibly negative effects for those at the bottom.  Of course, the search 
activity in the absence of JSA is not observed but, because the most powerful 
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predictor of future search intensity is current search intensity one way of looking at 
the conditional distribution is to estimate the average treatment effects for those with 
a different level of search intensity in wave 1.  The paper has already shown that those 
with low levels of search intensity in wave 1 are more likely to be moved off the 
claimant count by JSA.  This is done for search intensity in Table 11 and the number 
of search methods in Table 12.  There is no evidence here of any distributional 
effects. 
 
The Treatment Effect for Stayers and Movers 
The theory suggested that the treatment effect for those who remain in claimant status 
(call this group the stayers) should be positive while for those who move out of 
claimant status (call this group the movers) it could be negative.  This suggests trying 
to estimate separate treatment effects for these two groups.   
Suppose we are interested in some outcome variable y with a distribution 
function G(y)7.  The distribution of y for wave 2 claimants and non-claimants is 
observed both pre-JSA (from the control group) and post-JSA (from the treatment 
group).  The notation used and the information available is summarized in Table 14.  
In addition, one can observe the proportions in claimant and non-claimant status in the 
treatment and control groups. 
From this information we would like to be able to identify the different 
treatment effects for the movers and the stayers.  One can think of classifying 
individuals by what their wave 2 claimant status would be under the pre-JSA and 
post-JSA regimes – this is a version of the full-outcomes approach used by Angrist 
                                                 
7 The discussion of identification is phrased in terms of the identification of the change in the 
distribution function because this is quite general and other statistics like mean treatment effects can be 
derived from it 
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and Imbens (1994).  Denote by ijp  the proportion of the population who would be in 
state i  (where i=C,N) under the pre-JSA regime and in state j under the post-JSA 
regime.  There are obviously 4 potential groups.  For each of these groups denote by 
( )0ijF y  the distribution of y under the pre-JSA regime and by ( )1ijF y  the distribution 
of y under the post-JSA regime.  There are eight such distribution functions so one 
cannot immediately identify the treatment effects for the different groups from the 
four observed distribution functions in Table 14. 
One can get some identifying assumptions if one takes the theory of job search 
choice seriously.  First, there are no individuals who would be non-claimants under 
the pre-JSA regime and are claimants under the post-JSA regime.  This amounts to 
the restriction: 
 0NCp =  (4) 
 This can be thought of as a version of the monotonicity assumption of Angrist and 
Imbens (1994).  This restriction allows us to estimate the other ijp  from observations 
on the proportion of claimants and non-claimants in pre- and post-JSA regimes.  For 
example, the excess of the proportion of non-claimants in the post-JSA regime over 
the pre-JSA regime is the estimate of CNp , the proportion of claimants in the post-
JSA regime is the estimate of CCp , and the proportion of non-claimants in the pre-
JSA regime is the estimate of NNp . 
 The restriction in (4) also implies that ( )0NCF y  and ( )1NCF y  are both 
undefined and irrelevant because they refer to the behaviour of individuals who do not 
exist.  This gives two identifying assumptions on the distribution functions. 
 The theory also predicts that the behaviour of those who are non-claimants in 
wave 2 in both regimes is the same under both regimes as the behaviour cannot be 
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influenced by a welfare system in which they do not participate.  This amounts to the 
identifying restriction: 
 0 1
NN NNF F=  (5) 
But even with these identifying restrictions we are still one restriction short of 
full identification.  What can be identified in this case?: Appendix D shows that the 
best that can be identified is the treatment effect for a weighted average of the movers 
and stayers which is given by: 
 
CN CN CC CC
CN CC CN CC
p F p F G
p p p p
∆ + ∆ ∆=+ +  (6) 
where 1 0G G G∆ = − , 1 0CN CN CNF F F∆ = − , the treatment effect for movers and 
1 0
CC CC CCF F F∆ = − , the treatment effect for stayers.  The numerator of the right-hand 
side of (6) is the overall treatment effect that has been analysed earlier and was found 
to be close to zero.  (6) says that this overall treatment effect (divided by the fraction 
of individuals for whom the treatment effect is non-zero) is a weighted average of the 
treatment effects for movers and stayers.  It should be apparent that (6) is consistent 
with positive effects for the stayers and negative effects for the movers with the 
weighted average of the two averaging out to the zero that is approximately the 
overall treatment effect.  Appendix D shows that the source of the inability to identify 
the separate treatment effects for movers and stayers is the lack of information on 
wave 2 claimants in the control group about who would be a mover and who a stayer 
if treatment were applied. 
 There are a number of ways in which one might make progress.  If one could 
find an ‘instrument’ that affected the sample proportions in (6) but left the treatment 
effects unchanged then one could use this to work out the treatment effects for movers 
and stayers.  However, anything that is likely to affect the proportion of movers and 
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stayers is also likely to affect the treatment effects e.g. more stringent eligibility 
requirements are likely to mean a larger positive treatment effect for stayers and a 
more negative one for movers. 
 Here, I take a less ambitious approach and seek to provide bounds for the 
treatment effects.  The finite nature of the outcome variables being considered helps 
to provide bounds.  To give an example of how this works, to get an upper bound for 
the treatment for stayers we assign all those with low values of the outcome variable 
among the wave 2 claimants in the control group to be stayers.  This minimizes the 
outcome variable for stayers in the control leading to an upper bound for the treatment 
effect.  The other side of this coin is a lower bound for the treatment effect for 
movers.  One can then apply the process in reverse to get an upper bound for the 
movers and a lower bound for the stayers. 
 The results of this exercise are presented for two outcome variables in Table 
15 – the proportion who have searched for work in the past week and the average 
number of search methods.  The 95% confidence intervals are computed using a 
bootstrap with 1000 replications.   The bounds are very large, especially for the 
movers because they are a smaller fraction of the group.  Because these bounds are (as 
is quite common) too large to be useful, I also report some bounds based on more 
‘intuitive’ restrictions. 
 To have very large positive treatment effects for the movers and large negative 
effects for the stayers is somewhat implausible as it implies that it is the stayers who 
had low levels of search intensity in the absence of treatment.  A reasonable 
restriction is that the distribution of search intensity among the stayers stochastically 
dominates that for the movers in the absence of treatment i.e to impose a bound of the 
form:  
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 0 0
CC CNF F≤  (7) 
Appendix D then shows that this can then be used to put an upper bound on the 
treatment effect for the stayers: of the form: 
 CC CF G∆ ≥ ∆  (8) 
and a lower bound on the treatment effect for the movers of the form:  
 
CC C
CN
CN
G p GF
p
∆ − ∆∆ ≤  (9) 
To get the other bounds, I impose a lower bound on the treatment effect for 
stayers of zero on the grounds that it is hard to believe that JSA reduced search 
activity for those who remained claimants.  This restriction, using (6), translates into 
an upper bound on the treatment effect for movers of zero as well, given that the 
overall change is zero.   
 Applying the intuitive bounds leads to the results in the second panel of Table 
15.  These are much smaller than the bounds obtained from the data restrictions alone.  
Because of the lower bound of zero imposed on the treatment effect for stayers there 
is little surprise that the bounds for stayers are non-negative but the bounds for the 
movers now lie almost all in the non-positive region of the real line. 
These bounds mean that the data is largely consistent with the view that the 
treatment effect is positive for the stayers and negative for the movers but it must also 
be admitted that it is also consistent with the view that it is zero for both groups 
 
9. Conclusion 
The introduction of JSA in the UK was a big deal – it seems to have reduced the 
claimant count by about 8 percentage points.  The impact was larger for those with 
low levels of search activity.  This obviously resulted in savings in the payment of 
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welfare benefits but it was also intended that the change increase the search activity of 
jobseekers and, hence, raise inflows into employment.  This paper has found no 
evidence that moves into employment or measures of search activity were increased 
by JSA and has argued that there serious problems with existing evidence on this 
subject.  However, this paper has not resolved all problems: it is not clear why there 
was little or no behavioural response to a regime change that did tighten eligibility 
conditions considerably. 
There is something of a puzzle here: the results suggest that one way to 
insulate oneself from the impact of JSA was to increase search intensity yet no 
claimants seem to have done that.  Rather, the implication of zero treatment effects is 
that claimants accepted JSA in a fatalistic way.  This might be because the 
construction of the treatment and control groups used here inevitably only looks at 
short-term impacts: perhaps the longer-term impacts were more positive.  It is 
difficult to provide a test of this in the absence of a good research design but there is 
certainly no sign of a change in reported search activity among the non-employed 
associated with the introduction of JSA.  Figure 13 presents a time series on the 
average number of search methods reported by the non-employed as a whole for the 
period 1995-1998.  The downward trend is primarily because the labour market 
recovery is meaning that a higher proportion of the non-employed are those who are 
not interested in paid.work.  There is no noticeable break at the introduction of JSA.  
Anyone who wanted to argue for a positive impact of JSA would have to argue that 
the downward trend would have been even more marked in the absence of JSA: while 
conceivable, this is hardly persuasive evidence. 
So, the best that can be said is that the short-run effect of JSA on search 
activity seems to have been negligible and the case for a longer-run impact unproven. 
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Table 1 
The Impact of JSA on the Outflow Rate From the Claimant Count 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
JSA Impact 0.212 0.281 0.279 
 [0.028] [0.035] [0.036] 
Trend 0.286 -0.227 -0.202 
 [0.083] [0.186] [0.201] 
Trend2 -0.433 -0.714 -0.981 
 [0.257] [0.258] [0.834] 
Trend3  6.466 6.052 
  [2.132] [2.475] 
Trend4   3.615 
   [10.732]
Observations 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.96 
 
Notes. 
1. This is a regression of the monthly dummy variables from the estimation of a Cox semi-
parametric proportional hazards model for the exit rate from the claimant count.  Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
2. Sample period is 1994-2000 inclusive. 
3. JSA impact is a dummy variable for being after the introduction of JSA in October 1996. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Impact of JSA on Flows Out of Claimant Status 
 
Estimated Impact of JSA on 1 2 3 4 
0.098 0.059 0.097 0.06 Flow Out of Claimant Status  
[0.013] [0.017] [0.013] [0.018] 
0.029 -0.008 0.03 -0.004 Flow into Employment 
[0.011] [0.014] [0.010] [0.014] 
0.069 0.067 0.066 0.064 Flow into Non-Claimant 
Non-Employment [0.010] [0.013] [0.010] [0.013] 
Number of observations 4301 9391 4227 8924 
Conditional on Not Being in Subsequent Employment 
0.092 0.083 0.089 0.078 Flow Out of Claimant Status 
[0.012] [0.016] [0.012] [0.016] 
Number of observations 4301 9391 4227 8924 
Difference in Difference No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Notes. 
1. the basic sample is those who are claimants in wave 1.  The estimated coefficients 
(standard errors in parentheses) refer to the impact of JSA as estimated in (1). 
2. The DiD estimates include treatment and control groups for 1995 as well as 1996. 
3. The controls used are sex, race, education, a quartic in experience, a quartic in duration 
since last worked, a dummy for whether ever worked, and regional dummies. 
 33
 
Table 3 
Impact of JSA on Flows Into Claimant Status: Non-Claimant, Non-Employed 
 
Estimated Impact of JSA on 1 2 3 4 
0.014 -0.005 0.014 -0.004 Flow into Claimant Status  
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] 
-0.008 0.008 -0.009 0.006 Flow into Employment 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 Flow into Non-Claimant 
Non-Employment [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Number of observations 23817 47812 23337 45886 
Conditional on Not Being in Subsequent Employment 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 Flow Out of Claimant Status 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Number of observations 22127 44468 21674 42622 
Difference in Difference No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
 
Notes. 
1. the basic sample is those who are non-employed but non-claimants in wave 1.  The 
estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) refer to the impact of JSA as 
estimated in (1). 
2. The DiD estimates include treatment and control groups for 1995 as well as 1996. 
3. The controls used are sex, race, education, a quartic in experience, a quartic in duration 
since last worked, a dummy for whether ever worked, and regional dummies. 
 
Table 4 
Impact of JSA on Flows Into Claimant Status: Employed 
 
Estimated Impact of JSA on 1 2 3 4 
-0.0012 0 -0.0013 0 Flow into Claimant Status  
[0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0006] [0.0009] 
0.0016 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0001 Flow into Employment 
[0.0011] [0.0015] [0.0011] [0.0015] 
0 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 Flow into Non-Claimant 
Non-Employment [0.001] [0.0012] [0.0009] [0.0012] 
Number of observations 90761 183192 90057 178963 
Conditional on Not Being in Subsequent Employment 
-0.031 -0.008 -0.045 -0.022 Flow Out of Claimant Status 
[0.019] [0.027] [0.018] [0.025] 
Number of observations 2342 4885 2320 4739 
Difference in Difference No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
 
Notes. 
1. the basic sample is those who are employed in wave 1.  The estimated coefficients 
(standard errors in parentheses) refer to the impact of JSA as estimated in (1). 
2. The DiD estimates include treatment and control groups for 1995 as well as 1996. 
3. The controls used are sex, race, education, a quartic in experience, a quartic in duration 
since last worked, a dummy for whether ever worked, and regional dummies. 
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Table 5 
Impact of JSA on Claimant Outflow by Wave 1 Search Intensity 
 
Wave 1 Search Intensity 1 2 3 4 
0.031 0.131 0.025 0.123 Don’t want work 
 [0.041] [0.038] [0.042] [0.040] 
0.154 0.128 0.142 0.113 Want Work – no search 
[0.036] [0.035] [0.037] [0.036] 
0.189 0.157 0.203 0.169 Search in Past 4 weeks 
[0.051] [0.046] [0.051] [0.047] 
0.082 0.064 0.08 0.061 Search in Past  week 
[0.013] [0.016] [0.013] [0.016] 
Difference in Difference No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4301 9391 4227 8924 
Notes. 
1. The sample are the claimants used and is the same as in Table 2.  Notes to that table apply 
here.  The search intensity variables are interacted with all year and treatment dummies. 
 
 
Table 6 
Impact of JSA on Claimant Outflow by Wave 1 Number of Search Methods 
 
No. of search methods in 
wave 1 
1 2 3 4 
0.099 0.127 0.09 0.119 0 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] 
0.114 0.148 0.111 0.118 1 
 [0.063] [0.058] [0.063] [0.064] 
0.175 0.183 0.161 0.161 2 
 [0.046] [0.044] [0.047] [0.046] 
0.126 0.093 0 0.084 3 
[0.036] [0.034] [0.000] [0.035] 
0.067 0.063 0.06 0.064 4 
 [0.032] [0.031] [0.032] [0.031] 
0.071 0.035 0.08 0.043 5 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
0.09 0.053 0.084 0.047 6 
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] 
0.056 0.035 0.058 0.038 7 
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
0.052 0.081 0.058 0.085 8+ 
[0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050] 
Difference in Difference No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4301 9391 4227 8924 
Notes. 
1. The sample are the claimants used and is the same as in Table 2.  Notes to that table apply 
here.  The search intensity variables are interacted with all year and treatment dummies. 
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Table 7 
Dffierential Impact of JSA on Claimant Outflow for Short-Duration Claimants 
 
Other controls 1 2 3 4 
-0.045 -0.052 -0.054 0.067 None 
 [0.027] [0.024] [0.027] [0.024] 
-0.065 -0.067 -0.070 -0.074 Wave 1 search 
activity 
 
[0.026] [0.023] [0.026] [0.023] 
-0.062 -0.063 -0.066 -0.071 Wave 1 number 
of search methods 
 
[0.026] [0.023] [0.026] [0.023] 
Difference in 
Difference 
No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4301 9391 4227 8924 
 
Notes. 
1. The sample are the wave 1 claimants as in Table 2.  Notes to that table apply here. 
2. The reported coefficients are those for the differential treatment effect on those with duration 
less than 12 months. 
 
Table 8 
Average Impact of JSA on Search Activity 
 
Outcome Variable 1 2 3 4 
‘True’ Treatment Effects 
-0.012 0.009 -0.018 0.018 Search Intensity 
[0.039] [0.053] [0.041] [0.056] 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.022 0.022 Number of Search 
Methods [0.081] [0.109] [0.076] [0.105] 
Number of 
observations 
4301 9391 4227 8924 
‘Spurious’ Treatment Effects 
0.101 0.107 0.071 0.07 Search Intensity 
[0.040] [0.053] [0.045] [0.061] 
0.246 0.227 0.14 0.135 Number of Search 
Methods [0.072] [0.097] [0.074] [0.101] 
Number of 
observations 
4794 10741 4007 8640 
 
Difference in 
Difference 
No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Notes. 
1. The sample in the panel labelled ‘True Treatment Effects’ are the claimants used and is the 
same as in Table 2.  Notes to that table apply here. 
2. The sample in the panel labelled ‘Spurious Treatment Effects’ use as the sample those who are 
claimants at wave 2.  For the treatment group this will be affected by JSA. 
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Table 9 
Reconciling ‘True’ and ‘Spurious’ Treatment Effects 
 
 Control Group Treatment Group 
Proportion Search in Past Week at Wave 2 
Wave 2 Claimant 0.812 
(0.39) 
0.838 
(0.37) 
Wave 2 Non-Claimant 0.310 
(0.46) 
0.424 
(0.49) 
All 0.734 
(0.44) 
0.736 
(0.44) 
Average Number of Search Methods in Wave 2 
Wave 2 Claimant 4.39 
(2.42) 
4.54 
(2.40) 
Wave 2 Non-Claimant 1.69 
(2.59) 
2.22 
(2.65) 
All 3.97 
(2.63) 
3.97 
(2.66) 
Sample Sizes 
Wave 2 Claimant 339 521 
Wave 2 Non-Claimant 1849 1591 
All 2188 2112 
 
Notes. 
1. These relate to 1996 treatment and control groups only who are not in employment at 
wave 2.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 10 
The Impact of JSA on the Distribution of Search Intensity 
 
Wave 2 Search 
Intensity 
1 2 3 4 
0.012 0.011 0.01 0.006 Don’t want work 
 [0.009] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] 
-0.01 -0.019 -0.008 -0.018 Want Work – no 
search [0.010] [0.013] [0.010] [0.013] 
-0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 Search in Past 4 
weeks [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010] 
0.002 0.01 0.002 0.013 Search in Past  
week [0.013] [0.018] [0.013] [0.018] 
Difference in 
Difference 
No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4300 9390 4300 9390 
Notes. 
1. The sample are those who are claimants in wave 1 and is the same as in Table 2.  Notes to that 
table apply here. 
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Table 11 
Impact of JSA on Distribution of Search Methods 
 
No. of search 
methods in wave 
2 
1 2 3 4 
0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.011 0 
 [0.012] [0.017] [0.012] [0.016] 
0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 1 
 [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] 
0.003 0.014 0.002 0.007 2 
 [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] 
-0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.006 3 
[0.009] [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] 
-0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009 4 
 [0.010] [0.013] [0.010] [0.014] 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 5 
[0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.015] 
-0.012 -0.018 -0.012 -0.015 6 
[0.012] [0.015] [0.012] [0.016] 
0.008 0.017 0.007 0.018 7 
[0.010] [0.013] [0.010] [0.013] 
0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 8+ 
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] 
Difference in 
Difference 
No Yes No Yes 
Other Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4301 9391 4227 8924 
Notes. 
1. The sample are those who are claimants in wave 1 and  is the same as in Table 2.  Notes to 
that table apply here. 
 
 
Table 12 
Treatment Effect by Wave 1 Level of Search Intensity 
 
Wave 1 
Search 
Intensity 
1 2 3 4 Number of 
Obser-
vations 
-0.045 -0.033 -0.167 -0.171 329 Don’t want 
work 
 
[0.141] [0.188] [0.164] [0.204]  
0.153 0.118 0.222 0.208 430 Want Work 
– no search [0.110] [0.148] [0.117] [0.156]  
-0.096 -0.071 -0.048 -0.143 217 Search in 
Past 4 weeks [0.151] [0.202] [0.171] [0.214]  
-0.049 0.019 -0.062 0.017 3324 Search in 
Past  week [0.055] [0.077] [0.057] [0.079]  
Difference in 
Difference 
No Yes No Yes  
Other 
Controls 
No No Yes Yes  
Notes. 
1. The sample are those who are claimants in wave 1 and is the same as in Table 2.  Notes to that 
table apply here. 
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Table 13 
Treatment Effect by Wave 1 Number of Search Methods 
 
Wave 1 
Number of 
Search 
Methods 
1 2 3 4 Number of 
Obser-
vations 
0.287 0.253 0.339 0.343 747 0 
 [0.132] [0.173] [0.131] [0.178]  
0.345 0.63 0.266 0.625 151 1 
 [0.305] [0.431] [0.333] [0.506]  
-0.22 -0.396 -0.285 -0.537 267 2 
 [0.227] [0.288] [0.238] [0.326]  
0.049 0.04 0.104 0.04 437 3 
[0.163] [0.218] [0.165] [0.232]  
0.196 0.07 0.157 0.016 571 4 
 [0.153] [0.203] [0.156] [0.209]  
-0.021 -0.039 -0.076 0.006 699 5 
[0.146] [0.197] [0.151] [0.200]  
-0.035 0.01 -0.046 0.026 757 6 
[0.138] [0.193] [0.141] [0.195]  
-0.132 -0.091 -0.083 0.09 457 7 
[0.196] [0.260] [0.193] [0.260]  
-0.077 0.395 -0.153 0.3 215 8+ 
[0.324] [0.410] [0.366] [0.430]  
Difference in 
Difference 
No Yes No Yes  
Other 
Controls 
No No Yes Yes  
Notes. 
1. The sample are those who are claimants in wave 1 and is the same as in Table 2.  Notes to 
that table apply here. 
 
Table 14 
Observable outcomes: summary of notation 
 
Second Wave Claimant 
Status 
Pre-JSA Post-JSA 
Non-Claimant ( )0NG y  ( )1NG y  
Claimant ( )0CG y  ( )1CG y  
All ( )0G y  ( )1G y  
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Table 15 
Bounds on Treatment Effects for Movers and Stayers 
 
 Proportion Searched in Past 
Week 
Average Number of Search 
Methods 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Bounds From Data Restrictions 
Stayers -0.073 
(-0.113,-0.037) 
0.048 
(0.023,0.073) 
-0.386 
(-0.621,-0.161) 
0.566 
(0.379,0.746) 
     
Movers -0.382 
(-0.529,0.190) 
0.618 
(0.471,0.810) 
-4.734 
(0.023,0.073) 
3.107 
(2.330,3.960) 
Bounds From Intuitive Restrictions 
Stayers 0 
(0,0) 
0.026 
(0.001,0.048) 
0 
(0,0) 
0.147 
(-0.142,0.316) 
     
Movers -0.195 
(-0.339,-0.006) 
0.016 
(-0.255,0.329) 
-1.286 
(-2.030,-0.453) 
-0.076 
(-1.661,1.747) 
Notes. 
1. The estimates are reported, followed in parentheses by the 95% confidence 
interval derived from a bootstrap of 1000 replications. 
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Figure 1 
The UK Claimant Count. 1984-2004 
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Notes:   
1. The source of these data is the administrative records of the welfare system 
– they can be found at www.nomisweb.co.uk . 
2. These are seasonally unadjusted. 
 
Figure 2 
Flows On and Off the Claimant Count 
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Notes:   
1. The source of these data is the administrative records of the welfare system 
– they can be found at www.nomisweb.co.uk . 
2. These are seasonally adjusted. 
 
 41
Figure 3 
The Impact of JSA on Outflow Rates From the Claimant Count 
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Notes. 
1. These are the monthly dummies for the log hazard rate from the estimation of Cox semi-
parametric proportional hazards model for the exit rate from the claimant count.  August 
1996 is omitted so all hazard rates are relative to that 
2. The sample is the inflow between January 1994 and December 2000. 
3. The other controls are a quartic in age, gender and regional dummies 
 
Figure 4 
Claimant Count and ILO unemployment, 1992-2004 
 
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Claimant Count ILO Unemployment
 
Notes:   
1. The source of these data is the administrative records of the welfare system for the 
claimant count and the Labour Force Survey for ILO unemployment – they can be found 
at www.nomisweb.co.uk . 
2. These are seasonally unadjusted. 
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Figure 5 
Exits from the Claimant Count: Recorded Destinations 
 
 
Notes. 
1. These data come from the JUVOS administrative database on claimants. 
2. The raw data contain more different destinations and these are aggregated measures. 
 
Figure 6 
Average Weekly Payment Under UB/IS and JSA 
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1. Source is Work and Pensions Statistics, 2002. 
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Figure 7 
The Choice of Search Intensity 
 
 
Figure 8 
The Impact of Stricter Eligibility Conditions 
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Figure 9 
The relationship between individual search intensity and Eligibility Conditions 
 
 
Figure 10 
Search Intensity Among Claimants, Part I 
 
 
Notes. 
1. Computations from Labour Force Survey. 
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Figure 11 
Search Intensity Among Claimants, Part II 
 
 
 
Notes. 
1. Computations from Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
Figure 12 
Average Number of Search Methods Among Claimants 
 
 
Notes. 
1. Computations from Labour Force Survey. 
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Figure 13 
The Average Number of Search Methods Among the Non-employed, 1995-1998 
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Notes. 
1. Computations from Labour Force Survey. 
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Appendix A: A Typical Jobseeker’s Agreement 
 
 48
 
 
Notes: This is taken from Poynter and Barnes (1997). 
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Appendix B 
A Simple Model of the Determination of Search Intensity 
 
The value function for being without a job can be written as: 
 ( ),max ( ) ( ) ( )u us r u urV b s V w V dF w c sβ λ  = + − − ∫  (10) 
where r is the reservation wage, s is search intensity, F(w) is the distribution function 
of wage offers, β is the discount factor, ( )u sλ  is the arrival rate of offers and ( )uc s  
is the cost of search effort. 
 Before analysing the behaviour of someone without a job it is useful to discuss 
the behaviour of someone with a job.  Similarly, the value function for an employed 
worker at wage w can be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ( ) ( ) uw e ewV w w s V x V w dF x V V w c sβ λ δ  = + − + − −    ∫  (11) 
where δ  is the rate of job loss, assumed to be exogenous.  This can be thought of as 
leading to a solution for search intensity, s(w).  Differentiating (11) we have that: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1'
1e
V w
s w F wβ δ λ= + + −  (12) 
and, integrating by parts, one then has: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1
( ) ( ) 1 '( )
( ) 1w w w e
F x
V x V w dF x F x V x dx dx
s x F xβ δ λ
−− = − =   + + −∫ ∫ ∫  (13) 
 
Substituting this into (11), the first-order condition for the choice of search intensity 
by a worker employed at wage w can be written as: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
'
( ) 1
e
ew
e
s w F x
dx c s w
s s x F x
λ
β δ λ
∂ − =∂ + + −∫  (14) 
Note that the solution to this is independent of the level of benefits paid when 
unemployed. 
 
Now consider the behaviour of those without a job.  Using  (13) one can write the 
value function for the unemployed as:  
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ),
1
max ( )
( ) 1
u
s r u ur
e
F x dx
V b s c s
s x F x
β λ β δ λ
−= + −+ + −∫  (15) 
The reservation wage will be the level of the wage such that ( ) uV r V= .  For given 
levels of benefit and search intensity this will solve the equation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ( ))
( ) 1u e u er e
F x dx
r b s s r c s c s r
s x F x
λ λ β δ λ
−= + − − +   + + −∫  (16) 
One can think of a solution to this equation ( ),r b s  where the reservation wage 
depends positively on b as differentiation of (16) leads to: : 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) 1
0
1
e
u
s x F xr
b s F x
β δ λ
β δ λ
+ + −∂ = >∂ + + −  (17) 
The dependence of r on s is ambiguous in sign as differentiation of (16) leads to:  
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) 1 1
'
1 ( ) 1
e u
ur
u e
s x F x F x dxsr c s
s ss F x s x F x
β δ λ λ
β δ λ β δ λ
 + + − −∂∂ = − ∂ ∂+ + − + + −  ∫  (18) 
The intuition is that an increase in search intensity makes the individual more (resp. 
less) choosy if the marginal return to search activity is positive (resp negative). 
 
Using these results on b, let us know differentiate (15) to work out the impact of the 
value of being unemployed of b and s:  We have:  
 ( ) ( )( ) 01
u
u
V
b s F x
β δβ β δ λ
∂ += >∂ + + −  (19) 
and:  
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
'
1 ( ) 1
u
u
ur
u e
F x dxsV c s
s ss F x s x F x
λβ δβ β δ λ β δ λ
 −∂∂ += − ∂ ∂+ + − + + −  ∫  
which is first increasing and then decreasing in s.  Also of importance is the 
dependence of the optimal b on s.  This is negative as a rise in b raises the reservation 
wage and this reduces the return to searching.  Hence the indifference curves must 
look as drawn in Figure 7. 
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Appendix C 
Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Treatment and Control Groups 
 
Table C1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 All control Treatment 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
 
Wave 1 Search Activity 
Don't Want Job 0.065 0.247 0.066 0.248 0.065 0.246 
Want Job but 
no Search 
0.093 0.291 0.090 0.286 0.096 0.295 
Searched in last 
4 weeks but not 
last week 
0.052 0.222 0.050 0.217 0.054 0.227 
Number of 
search methods 
4.22 2.47 4.24 2.48 4.19 2.46 
Wave 2 Search Activity and Claimant Status 
Non-claimant 
Non-employed 
0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.19 0.40 
Claimant 0.65 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.60 0.49 
Don't Want Job 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 
Want Job but 
no Search 
0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 
Searched in last 
4 weeks but not 
last week 
0.04 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 
Searched in 
Past Week 
0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49 
Employed 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 
Number of 
search methods 
3.43 2.81 3.48 2.80 3.38 2.82 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45 
Black 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 
Asian 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 
Experience 18.50 12.58 18.67 12.53 18.33 12.64 
University 
Graduate 
0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 
`A' Level or 
equivalent 
0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.40 
No 
qualifications 
0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 
Ever worked 0.92 0.26 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.28 
Duration since 
last job 
3.11 4.36 3.10 4.35 3.13 4.37 
Married 0.62 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.61 0.49 
Number of 
children 
0.76 1.19 0.77 1.20 0.74 1.18 
Age of 
youngest child 
2.31 4.39 2.33 4.39 2.29 4.40 
tyne & wear 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 
Rest of north 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
South yorkshire 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 
West yorkshire 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 
rest of yorks+ 
Humberside 
0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 
East midlands 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25 
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east anglia 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.17 
inner london 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 
outer london 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 
South west 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 
West midlands 
(met) 
0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 
rest of west 
midlands 
0.04 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.18 
Greater 
manchester 
0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 
Merseyside 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 
rest of north-
west 
0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 
Wales 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Strathclyde 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 
rest of scotland 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 
Northern 
ireland 
0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23 
 
Notes. 
1. All this data refers to those who are claimants and to 1996 only. 
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Table C2 
The Balancing of Treatment and Control Groups 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Sample All  All Non-
employed 
Non-
employed 
Don’t Want Job -0.012 -0.034 -0.024 -0.041 
 [0.034] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038] 
Want Job but no Search -0.015 -0.021 -0.032 -0.034 
 [0.031] [0.032] [0.033] [0.035] 
Searched in last 4 weeks 
but not last week 
0.017 0.016 0.027 0.025 
 [0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.036] 
Number of search 
methods 
-0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] 
Male  -0.022  -0.011 
  [0.028]  [0.032] 
Black  0.039  0.022 
  [0.038]  [0.040] 
Asian  -0.012  -0.008 
  [0.036]  [0.039] 
Experience  -0.002  0 
  [0.002]  [0.003] 
Experience squared  0  0 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
University Graduate  0.048  -0.018 
  [0.024]*  [0.028] 
`A’ Level of equivalent  0.007  0.017 
  [0.021]  [0.023] 
No qualifications  -0.032  -0.031 
  [0.018]  [0.020] 
ever had paid job -0.057  -0.073 
  [0.030]  [0.034]* 
Duration since last job  0.009  0.009 
  [0.004]*  [0.004]* 
Duration squared  0  0 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Married  0.005  0.009 
  [0.028]  [0.032] 
Number of children  -0.009  0 
  [0.016]  [0.017] 
Age of youngest child  -0.001  -0.004 
  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Married* Male  0.009  0.009 
  [0.033]  [0.037] 
No. of Kids * Male   0.006  -0.002 
  [0.018]  [0.019] 
Age of youngest child* 
Male 
 0.001  0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.005] 
tyne & wear  0.009  0.032 
  [0.049]  [0.055] 
rest of northern region -0.008  0.001 
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  [0.039]  [0.044] 
south Yorkshire 0.034  0.048 
  [0.048]  [0.052] 
west Yorkshire 0.003  0.014 
  [0.042]  [0.046] 
rest of yorks & Humberside -0.088  -0.05 
  [0.048]  [0.055] 
east midlands -0.025  -0.001 
  [0.034]  [0.038] 
east anglia  0.06  0.082 
  [0.044]  [0.050] 
inner London -0.068  -0.048 
  [0.033]*  [0.036] 
outer London 0.024  0.062 
  [0.032]  [0.035] 
south west  0.022  0.018 
  [0.033]  [0.038] 
west midlands (met county) -0.024  -0.009 
  [0.035]  [0.039] 
rest of west midlands -0.026  -0.01 
  [0.042]  [0.046] 
Greater Manchester -0.018  0 
  [0.039]  [0.043] 
Merseyside  -0.019  0.016 
  [0.043]  [0.048] 
rest of north west -0.04  -0.041 
  [0.044]  [0.052] 
Wales  0.002  0.034 
  [0.036]  [0.040] 
Strathclyde  -0.017  0.023 
  [0.037]  [0.041] 
rest of Scotland 0.018  0.021 
  [0.037]  [0.042] 
northern Ireland -0.039  -0.035 
  [0.036]  [0.040] 
Observations 5292 5207 4301 4227 
p-value 0.82 0.22 0.57 0.64 
Notes. 
1. These tables report the marginal effects from a probit model in which the dependent 
variable is one if the observation comes from the treatment group and zero if it comes 
from the control group. Standard errors in brackets and * denotes coefficient significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1%. 
2. The reported p-value is from a test of the hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are zero 
– this is a test that the treatment and control groups are ‘balanced’. 
3. The first two columns report the estimates when the sample is all who are claimants at 
wave 1 and the second two columns when the sample is restricted to those who had not 
exited to employment at wave 2. 
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Appendix D 
Identifying Treatment Effects by Final Claimant Status 
 
With the imposition of the identifying assumptions described in the text we must have 
the following relationships between the observed distribution functions and the ones 
we would like to observe:  
 0 0
N NNG F=  (20) 
 0 11 11
NN NN CN CNNN NN CN CN
N
NN CN NN CN
p F p Fp F p FG
p p p p
++= =+ +  (21) 
 0 00
CC CC CN CN
C
CC CN
p F p FG
p p
+= +  (22) 
 1 1
C CCG F=  (23) 
From the discussion in the text, we know that ( ), ,CN NN CCp p p  are identified.  The 
lack of identification on the 'F s can be seen from the fact that there are four 
equations and five unknowns.  (20) says that 0
NNF  can be identified and (23) that 1
CCF  
can be identified.  Then, using (20) and (21) we have that: 
 
( ) 1 0
1
NN CN N NN N
CN
CN
p p G p G
F
p
+ −=  (24) 
This implies that the identification problem relates to 0
CCF  and 0
CNF .  So what can be 
identified?  Denote the overall distribution of y under the pre-JSA regime as ( )0G y  
and under the post-JSA regime as ( )1G y .  We must have the following: 
 ( )1 1 1NN CN N CC CG p p G p G= + +  (25) 
 ( )0 0 0NN N CC CN CG p G p p G= + +  (26) 
Taking differences and then using the relationships in (20) to (23) we end up 
with:  
 CN CN CC CCG p F p F∆ = ∆ + ∆  (27) 
so that:  
 
CN CN CC CC
CN CC CN CC
p F p F G
p p p p
∆ + ∆ ∆=+ +  (28) 
 
i.e. the change in the distribution function of outcomes between the treatment and 
control divided by the fraction of the population to have a non-zero treatment effect 
can be interpreted as the average treatment effect across those who remain in claimant 
status post-JSA and those who are moved out of claimant status.  This is a fairly 
obvious result as these are the only groups with a non-zero treatment effect. And the 
overall treatment effect can be obtained by comparing the distribution outcomes 
between treatment and control groups. 
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